

Florida Residents Charged with Conspiring to Violate Iran Sanctions, Other Crimes

Office of Public Affairs, Department of Justice | September 14, 2021

Three Florida residents have been charged in federal district court in Miami with crimes related to their alleged violations of U.S. sanctions on Iran, and money laundering.

Defendants Mohammad Faghihi, 52, his wife Farzaneh Modarresi, 53, and his sister Faezeh Faghihi, 50, operated Florida company Express Gene. According to the criminal complaint affidavit, between October 2016 and November 2020, Express Gene received numerous wire transfers from accounts in Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, Singapore, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates, totaling almost \$3.5 million. It is alleged that some of the money received was used by Express Gene and its principals to purchase genetic sequencing equipment from U.S. manufacturers and ship them to Iran without a license from the Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) to export the machines, despite sanctions on Iran. The incoming money also was used by F. Faghihi and Modarresi to fund the 2019 purchase of the Express Gene property, says the affidavit.

On Feb. 20, Faghihi arrived at Miami International Airport from Iran, where he was inspected by Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers. According to the charging documents, during his inspection by CBP officers, Faghihi made false statements, including that he did not practice his profession in Iran or conduct any type of research in Iran. In fact, according to the affidavit, Faghihi was the director of a laboratory within Shiraz University of Medical Science in Iran bearing his name: "Dr. Faghihi's Medical Genetic Center." In addition, his luggage contained 17 vials of unknown biological substances covered with ice packs and concealed beneath bread and other food items, according to the affidavit. All the vials were subject to regulations.

From approximately 2013 to approximately 2020, Faghihi was an Assistant Professor at the Department of Psychiatry & Behavioral Sciences at the University of Miami (UM), Miller School of Medicine.

To read the full article: <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/florida-residents-charged-conspiring-violate-iran-sanctions-other-crimes>

The Next 75 Years of U.S. Science and Innovation Policy: an Introduction

Robert W. Conn, Michael M. Crow, Cynthia A. Friend, and Marcia McNutt | July 12, 2021

Since the end of World War II, a particular conception of the relationship between scientific research and societal benefits has dominated US science and technology policy. As laid out in Vannevar Bush's seminal 1945 report, *Science, the Endless Frontier*, the federal government, by funding basic research at the nation's universities and independent research institutions, would generate both new scientific knowledge and the skilled practitioners needed to apply that knowledge to societal problems, thereby ensuring "our health, prosperity, and security as a nation in the modern world."

The vision at the heart of *Science, the Endless Frontier*—that society would benefit from new knowledge and should therefore support the generation of that knowledge—has been abundantly realized. Research conducted by America's universities and independent research institutions on behalf of the federal government has opened pathways to improved living standards, public health, and national security not only in the United States but around the world. However, science and the broader society in which science is embedded have changed radically over the past three-quarters of a century. Even as new scientific discoveries and new and innovative technologies have spurred economic growth and reduced poverty worldwide, wealth, learning, and opportunity remain available to far too small a proportion of humanity. The development of new medical treatments and procedures has extended life spans but has not prevented massive inequities in health care and health outcomes, as has been starkly revealed during the current COVID-19 pandemic. A central debate in the years after World War II—how best to structure scientific research to meet human needs—remains a work in progress in this world of accelerating change.

To read the full article: <https://issues.org/the-next-75-years-of-us-science-and-innovation-policy-an-introduction/>

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Miri Yemini | November 9, 2019

U.S. research may be subject to undue foreign influence in cases where a researcher has a foreign conflict of interest (COI). Federal grant-making agencies can address this threat by implementing COI policies and requiring the disclosure of information that may indicate potential conflicts. GAO reviewed five agencies—which together accounted for almost 90 percent of all federal research and development expenditures at universities in fiscal year 2018—and found that three have agency-wide COI policies, while two do not (see figure). The three agencies with existing policies focus on financial interests but do not specifically address or define non-financial interests, such as multiple professional appointments. In the absence of agency-wide COI policies and definitions on non-financial interests, researchers may not fully understand what they need to report on their grant proposals, leaving agencies with incomplete information to assess the risk of foreign influence. GAO found that, regardless of whether an agency has a conflict of interest policy, all five agencies require researchers to disclose information—such as foreign support for their research—as part of the grant proposal that could be used to determine if certain conflicts exist.

To read the full article: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/1028315319887392>



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